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ABSTRACT 
SEARCHING FOR THE FULCRUM: CAN ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS LOWER SPENDING BY BALANCING SPECIALISTS-TO-
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS? 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
VISHAL ANAND SHETTY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor David Chin 
Background: 
While value-based payment models emphasizing care coordination have been widely 
implemented to improve quality and lower expenditures, supporting empirical evidence is 
sparse. Our objective was to quantify the impact of specialist-to-primary care physician 
involvement within accountable care organization (ACO) and its association with lower 
spending.  
 
Methods: 
We conducted a retrospective cohort study of Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs 
from 2012-2016 using publicly available data provided by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services at the ACO level. We examined the association between the 
proportion of primary care services delivered by specialists versus other types of care 
providers and ACO spending using a generalized estimating equation model.      
 
Results: 
The analytic dataset included 1381 MSSP-years. When compared to ACOs at the lowest 
(<35%) and highest (>60) levels of providing primary care services through specialists, 
ACOs who had 35% to 40% of primary care services delivered by specialists spent 
$1,124 (95% CI, $358 to $1,891) and $969 (95% CI, $250 to $1,688) less per capita, 
respectively. When stratified at varying levels of specialists providing primary care 
services, having four years of experience in the Medicare Shared Savings Program was 
consistently associated with lower spending when compared to having one to three years 
of experience.  
 
Conclusions and Relevance: 
The optimal portion of specialists providing primary care services - to reduce spending - 
was found to be 35% to 40%. These findings suggest that integrating specialists in to the 
activities and objectives of MSSP ACOs could lead to lower spending and better 
performance.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) was authorized to create the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). An ACO is a healthcare 
payment and delivery model intended to incentivize a collection of healthcare providers 
to cooperate, communication, and coordinate patient care across multiple clinical 
settings.1 The premise behind the model is that by creating accountability and realigning 
incentives for providers, ACOs can improve patient outcomes while lowering costs. For 
each ACO participant, CMS establishes a financial benchmark based on the beneficiaries 
in Medicare Parts A and B, who would have been assigned to the ACO in the three-year 
period prior to the start of the ACO’s agreement period. If the expenditures for an ACO’s 
beneficiaries are less than this benchmark in a given year, while fulfilling quality measure 
objectives, the ACO receives a financial payment equal to a proportion of the savings. As 
of April 2017, there were over 500 Medicare ACO contracts, providing care for nearly 10 
million people.2  
Expanding the influence of primary care was believed to provide the foundation 
necessary to slow the growth of spending;3  thus, the putative success of the MSSP ACO 
incentive structures depended primarily on strong leadership and expanding primary care 
physicians’ (PCPs) role to promote care coordination.4, 5 Despite the promulgation of the 
ACO payment model, studies have reported only modest improvements in lowering 
expenditures and improving quality.6, 7  
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As most health expenditures are attributed to a small proportion of patients with 
complex clinical conditions,8 specialists directly responsible for the ACOs’ objectives 
may play an important role in promoting coordination of care for these high-cost 
patients.9 Additionally, specialists can serve to regulate the utilization of expensive 
specialty services within the entire patient population. If aligned with the interests of the 
ACO, specialists may be incented to provide specialty services only when clinically 
necessary.10 While CMS does not require the inclusion of specialists within MSSP 
ACOs,11 previous studies suggest that the integration of specialists may be beneficial for 
ACO financial success,12,13 Given the short time period since the implementation of the 
ACO model for Medicare,1 the current literature related to this topic is limited. While the 
integration of specialists in ACOs may impact performance, empirical evidence is scarce. 
A recent study examined the association between the degree to which an ACO was 
primary care focused and spending and utilization rates.10 Investigators found that ACOs 
with the least primary care focus (and higher specialty focus) had lower utilization rates, 
but similar spending levels compared to ACOs with the most primary care focus.10 While 
this study provides some insight into the effects of specialists within ACOs, it did not 
examine ACO spending when PCP-Specialist involvement levels were more balanced.  
We sought to examine the impact of PCP-to-specialist involvement on spending 
across a range of specialist activity levels in MSSP ACOs. We also examined the 
association between spending and a number of ACO characteristics across specialist 
activity levels. We hypothesized that the lowest expenditures will be among ACOs 
between the lowest and highest proportion of specialist activity. ACOs with the lowest 
levels of specialist activity will lack the specialized clinical expertise to coordinate care 
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or restrict utilization of specialty care for complex patients. Conversely, ACOs with 
highest levels of specialty activity may be susceptible to unnecessary specialty services.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 METHODS 
Data Source 
 
We used the CMS Shared Savings Program public use files to conduct our 
analysis.14 These data represent ACO-level annual characteristics for the first four MSSP 
ACO performance periods from April 2012 to December 2016. 
Study Variables 
Outcome and Primary Predictor 
 
The outcome was total expenditures per assigned beneficiary person year in the 
performance year, as defined by the Medicare Shared Savings Program specifications.15 
The primary predictor was specialist activity, which we defined as the proportion of 
primary care services provided by a specialist [see appendix]. 
Covariates 
 
We used the proportion of male and Black/African American beneficiaries, and 
beneficiaries aged 85 or older to account for ACO demographics. To account for the 
severity-of-illness within ACO, we used the proportion of ESRD beneficiary person-
years, disabled beneficiary person-years, dual-eligible person-years, and nondual-eligible 
person-years, which were adjusted by corresponding HCC risk scores. ACO 
characteristics (size, program experience in years, first year of participation) were 
represented by 1) the total attributed beneficiary person-years, 2) years since the ACO 
was first formed, 3) the calendar year started of the ACOs. 
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Statistical Analysis 
 
We calculated summary statistics for the outcome and our covariates by level of 
specialist activity, categorized into seven groups. For ACOs that started in 2012/2013 and 
2014, we examined trends in the proportion of participating physician specialists and 
specialist activity until 2016.  
We used a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model, clustering by ACO, to 
estimate the association between specialist activity and ACO expenditures while 
adjusting for ACO size and clinical risk-adjusted Medicare enrollment status groups. 
Then, we examined the relationship between other covariates and spending by stratifying 
on specialist activity group. Our primary variables of interest were gender, race, age 
attributed beneficiary proportions, ACO years of experience, first participation year, and 
ACO size. We also adjusted for the proportion of ESRD, disabled, dual-eligible, and non-
dual eligible person-years. Each proportion was dichotomized about the median while the 
experience and calendar year started variables were categorized by year, with one year of 
experience and the first period serving as referents, respectively. All statistical analysis 
was conducted using R Version 3.3.1.  
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CHAPTER 3  
RESULTS 
ACO Characteristics 
 
The analytic dataset included 1381 MSSP-years (221, 334, 393, and 433 MSSP 
ACOs for the second, third, and fourth performance periods respectively). Mean per 
capita expenditures were lowest ($10,673) among ACOs who had 35% to 40% of their 
primary care services provided by specialists and highest ($12,479) among ACOs who 
had greater than 60% of their primary care services provided by specialists (Table 1). The 
mean proportion of Black beneficiaries was lowest (14.3%) among ACOs with the least 
specialist activity (< 35% primary care services provided by specialists), and was highest 
(18.8%) among ACOs with high specialist activity (55% to 60% of primary care services 
provided by specialists). A similar trend was found in ACO size; ACOs with the least 
specialist activity tended to be the smallest (mean of 11,026 ACO beneficiary person-
years), while ACOs with high specialist activity (55% to 60% of primary care services 
provided by specialists) tended to be the largest (mean of 19,143 ACO beneficiary 
person-years. Conversely, the mean proportion of disabled beneficiary person-years and 
the mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary person-years followed the opposite trend. 
ACOs with the least specialist activity had the highest mean proportion of disabled 
beneficiary person-years (20.8%) and mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary 
person-years (13.1%). ACOs with the most specialist activity (> 60% primary care 
services provided by specialists) tended to have to lowest mean proportion of disabled 
beneficiary person-years (10.9%) and mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary 
person-years (6.9%). 
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For ACOs formed in 2012/2013, the proportion of specialists remained relatively 
constant across their first three years in the MSSP (47.7% in 2012/2013, 47.4% in 2014, 
44.9% in 2015), but dropped to 38.6% in the 2016 performance period (Figure 1). 
Similarly, for ACOs formed in 2014, the proportion of specialists was 41.7% and 40.8% 
in the 2014 and 2015 performance periods respectively, but dropped to 36.3% in the 2016 
performance period. At the same time, specialist activity remained fairly constant across 
performance periods for ACOs formed in 2012/2013 and ACOs formed in 2014.  
Expenditure Estimates 
 
After adjusting for ACO size, Medicare enrollment status, and severity-of-illness, 
ACOs at the extrema of specialist activity (<30% and >60% of primary care services 
provided by specialists) had the highest per capita expenditures when compared to the 
ACOs in the referent (35% to 40% of primary care services provided by specialists). 
When compared to the referent, ACOs with the lowest specialist activity spent $1,124 
(95% CI, $358 to $1,891) more per capita, and ACOs with the highest specialist activity 
spent $969 (95% CI, $250 to $1,688) more per capita (Table 2). Per capita expenditures 
followed a consistent trend of incremental increase in levels after the referent (Figure 2). 
The association between gender, age, and race, and per capita expenditures was 
inconsistent across specialist activity levels (Table 3). A second year of experience was 
associated with $1,119 to $2,759 lower expenditures across every level of specialist 
activity in comparison to one year of experience. Four years of experience was associated 
with 8.2% to 32.2% lower expenditures than two or three years of experience across all 
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levels of specialist activity (except for ACOs with >60% of primary care services 
provided by specialists).  
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Table 1: Outcome and ACO characteristic means by proportion of primary care 
services provided by a specialist (level of specialist activity) 
Proportion of Primary Care Services Provided by a Specialist  
Variable  < 35% 35% - 40% 40% - 45% 45% - 50% 50% - 55% 55% - 60% > 60% 
Per capita 
Expenditures 
12286 10673 10773 11019 10949 11287 12479 
Experience 
(Years) 
2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.1 
Performance 
Period 
Started (1-4) 
1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 
Proportion of 
male 
beneficiaries 
42.8% 42.4% 42.3% 42.0% 41.8% 41.7% 42.1% 
Proportion of 
beneficiaries 
aged 85+ 
13.2% 12.3% 12.3% 
 
12.2% 11.9% 12.8% 13.3% 
Proportion of 
Black 
beneficiaries 
14.3% 14.9% 18.2% 16.7% 17.6% 18.8% 17.3% 
ACO 
beneficiary 
person-years 
11026 14397 17794 18534 16778 19143 18133 
Proportion of 
ESRD 
person-years 
1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 
 
1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
Proportion of 
Disabled 
person-years 
20.8% 18.2% 15.0% 13.3% 11.5% 11.1% 10.9% 
Proportion of 
Dual person-
years 
13.1% 9.9% 9.6% 6.7% 
 
6.1% 6.2% 6.9% 
Proportion of 
Non-Dual 
person-years 
6.5% 70.8% 74.4% 79.0% 81.4% 81.6% 81.1% 
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Figure 1: Trends in specialist proportion (of participating physicians) and specialist 
activity for MSSP ACOs that formed in 2012/2013 and 2014 
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Table 2: Per capita expenditure estimates by proportion of primary care services 
provided by specialist (specialist activity), adjusted for ACO size, Medicare 
enrollment, and severity of illness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * indicates significance at alpha level = 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor Estimate 95% CI p-value 
Specialist Activity     
          < 35% 1124.92 358.43, 1891.41 0.0040* 
          35% - 40%  - - - 
          40% - 45% (ref.) 34.10 -325.89, 394.10 0.8527 
          45% - 50% 85.15 -277.16, 447.46 0.6450 
          50% - 55% 284.14 -175.05, 743.33 0.2252 
          55 % - 60%  337.19 -258.83, 933.07 0.2675 
          > 60%  969.34 250.51, 1688.17 0.0082* 
ACO Size 0.002 -0.006, 0.009 0.6105 
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Figure 2: Per capita expenditure estimate trend by proportion of primary care 
services provided by specialist (specialist activity) 
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Table 3: Per capita expenditure estimates by ACO characteristics, stratified by each 
specialist activity group and adjusted for Medicare enrollment status and severity of 
illness 
 
Note: * indicates significance at alpha level = 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of Primary Care Services Provided by a Specialist 
Variable < 35% 35% - 40% 40% - 45% 45% - 50% 50% - 55% 55% - 60% > 60% 
Experience 
(Year) 
       
    Two -2759* -1310* -1230* -1119* -1175* -1742* -2355* 
    Three -3139* -1179* -1436* -1306* -1383* -2003* -2687* 
    Four -3748* -1865* -1931* -1924* -1506* -2590* -1537* 
Year Started        
    2014 974 -1278* -319 -560* -519 870 -3489* 
    2015 -2917* -1077* -991* -1450* -404 -1284 -1812 
    2016 -1302 -1154* -1659* -1432* -1904* -2810* -1240 
Proportion 
male 
beneficiaries > 
median 
-92 -690* -383 -390 -475 -1148.9* -296 
Proportion 
beneficiaries 
age 85+ > 
median 
-761 -64 -481* 514 -715* 441 -61 
Proportion 
Black 
beneficiaries > 
median 
2278* -80 -216 102 -35 -204 -1097 
Total person-
years (ACO 
Size)   
0.023 -0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.025 -0.075 
14 
 
CHAPTER 4  
DISCUSSION 
During the first four performance years of the MSSP program, we found 
expenditures were lowest when ACOs had 35% to 40% of their primary care services 
provided by specialists while ACOs who provided primary care at the specialist activity 
extrema (<30% and >60%) had the highest expenditures. This finding suggests that there 
may be a balanced level of PCP-specialist involvement in ACOs which contributes to 
reduced spending.  
Our findings have several implications for the organization and structure of 
ACOs. While 35% to 40% of primary care services being provided by a specialist may 
not be a deliberate system design, it may suggest an organizational advantage when 
ACOs attempt to curtail spending. A certain proportion of specialists contributing to care 
coordination may lead to higher levels of engagement and better alignment of specialists 
with the goals of the ACO. This may also reflect an ACO’s propensity for having the 
provision of primary care services be multidisciplinary, which can be effective in the 
management of chronic disease.16 Moreover, our findings reinforce the importance of 
primary care physicians as the main conduit for care delivery in an ACO. Lower ACO 
expenditures may depend on empowering primary care physicians to lead in delivering 
and coordinating care, while creating ways to engage the right specialists based on 
contextual factors such as patient needs and available resources.  
Our observation of ACOs with two or more years of experience in the MSSP 
having lower expenditures than ACOs in their first year is consistent with previous 
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literature on similar risk-based contracting programs.17–19 This finding suggests that 
several years may be required for ACOs to implement the clinical and structural 
adjustments necessary for effective spending reduction. ACOs with four years of 
experience consistently having the lowest expenditures across levels of specialist activity 
may suggest that ACOs find ways to gradually reduce spending as they gain more 
experience in the MSSP. However, there may be a selection bias in that ACOs that 
persevere to the fourth program year are more capable of reducing spending when 
compared to ACOs that drop out earlier.  
The trend in the proportion of specialists decreasing during the 2016 performance 
period may suggest a preemptive reaction by ACOs to changes in the calculation of the 
ACO financial benchmarking. In June 2016, new MSSP rules were finalized which 
incorporated regional FFS expenditures in to the calculation of an ACO’s benchmark.15 
Under the historical spending calculation method, ACOs may be incented to limited 
efforts to reduce spending and may even increase spending in certain years.20 The 
changes to the benchmark definitions may have removed these incentives and may 
thereby influence ACOs to drop specialists who were thought to be incurring high costs. 
Given the growing number of patients across the United States receiving care 
under the umbrella of an ACO (32 million as of the end of the first quarter of 2017),2 the 
ACO model may contribute to reducing health care expenditures. While specialist 
integration may be a vital piece for producing cost savings in ACOs, few incentives exist 
for clinician engagement.12 Extrinsic factors may also limit the integration of 
specialists.12,21 For example, ACOs located in rural areas may have physician shortages, 
particularly among specialists.21 Smaller ACOs may be limited in their capacity to 
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influence specialist practice patterns through control of primary care referrals.12 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study could provide a basis for policymakers and ACO 
organization leadership to take concrete steps toward integrating specialists, such as 
adopting established clinical quality measures for specialists,22 or designing financial 
penalty programs for specialist lacks of participation in ACOs.  
Limitations  
 
Our study has limitations. First, our primary predictor is intended to represent 
specialist integration and engagement. However, this measure may not reflect some 
important elements of specialist integration such as care coordination between specialists 
and PCPs and a prioritization of “high-value” specialty services. Second, the 
generalizability of these findings may be limited to MSSP ACOs. While the ACO model 
is similar across different contexts and payers, the MSSP program has its own set of 
structural conditions and requirements which may not apply to other types of ACOs. 
Third, ACO ownership status and rurality are two key factors that we could not account 
for in our analysis, which previous studies indicate may have an impact on our 
association of interest.6, 21, 23  
Conclusion 
 
Since the creation of accountable care organizations, an emphasis has been placed 
on primary care to drive the success of the model. We found ACOs who provide 35% to 
40% of primary care services through specialists to have lower expenditures than ACOs 
at any other level of specialist activity. Our findings provide initial evidence for the 
benefit of integrating specialists in MSSP ACOs. Evaluations of utilization patterns of 
17 
 
specialty services at the beneficiary level and coordination between PCPs and specialists 
at the provider level will be important for understanding how ACOs across levels of 
specialist activity differ in organizational behavior. 
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APPENDIX 
EXPLANATION OF PRIMARY PREDICTOR 
The primary predictor used in this study was the proportion of primary care 
services given by a specialist. This measure was calculated by dividing the total number 
primary care services given by providers in an ACO (adjusted by person-years) by the 
number of primary care services given by a specialist.  A primary care service is defined 
as an ambulatory evaluation and management (E&M) service determined by Healthcare 
Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes 99201-99215, 99304-99350, G0402, 
G0438, G0439, and by revenue center codes 0521, 0522, 0524, 0525 when submitted by 
a federally qualified health center or rural health clinic.15 If the largest share of a 
Medicare patient’s primary care services are provided by a physician who is a member of 
an ACO, that patient will be retrospectively attributed to the ACO. Providers aligned with 
ACOs are identified through tax identification numbers (TINs) and physician type is 
identified through physician specialty codes. Providers who can give primary care 
services include primary care physicians (internists, family medicine physicians, 
geriatricians, and pediatricians), specialists, nurse practitioners, clinical nurse specialists, 
and physician assistants, and services given at a Federally Qualified Health Center or 
Rural Health Clinic.  
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